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MOVE/Philadelphia Bombing:




In 1985 police bombed the Philadelphia headquarters occupied by members of
the black counterculture group MOVE. What began 15 years earlier as a neigh-
borhood squabble provoked by conflicting lifestyles ended in the destruction of
sixty-one homes and the death of eleven residents—five of them children. Some
250 people were left homeless. The authors examine the dynamics of the con-
flict, analyzing attempts at third-party mediation and the possibility of resolu-
tion without violence. Interventions raised ethical issues, and there were failures
to define and involve appropriate parties, break down mutual misperceptions,
oversee implementation of an agreement, and understand the decision-making
structure of the groups involved. All these contributed to the failure of third
party intervention and may have accelerated the violence.
Father Paul Washington recalls seeing Philadelphia Mayor Wilson
Goode in church in April 1985. The mayor told him he was going to have
to do something about the radical, back-to-nature group, MOVE. "I am
going to have to move very carefully and cautiously, because we want to
*Printed with permission of Conflict Resolution Center International, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. This article was adapted from "MOVE/Philadelphia Bombing: A Conflict
Resolution History" (July 1986). Conflict Resolution Notes Vol. 4, No. 1, 2-9.
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avoid making any of the mistakes that were made back there in 1978." A
month later, on May 13, 1985, an assault on MOVE'S Osage Avenue head-
quarters began. Police shot 10,000 rounds of ammunition in ninety minutes
and finally dropped a bomb from a helicopter incinerating five MOVE
members and six children, and destroying sixty-one homes.
"Back there in 1978," a long brewing series of conflicts with MOVE
erupted in a shoot-out with police in which one policeman was killed. What
"mistakes" was Mayor Goode trying to avoid? What lessons can conflict
resolvers learn from these confrontations?
To answer these questions, the Conflict Resolution Center International
undertook a major research project. The Center interviewed people who
had tried to intervene in the MOVE conflicts between the early 1970s and
1985. All agreed that to understand the 1985 disaster, one must first study
the 1978 Shootout.
MOVE
MOVE began in the early 1970s as a non-violent, predominantly black,
counterculture activist group. It originally called itself "the Movement,"
later shortened to MOVE. Its founder, John Africa, was the philosophical
leader. He advocated an anti-technology approach, respect for animal life
and communal living. Its members took on the surname "Africa" to express
their sense of communal family. MOVE is often labeled as an urban, back-
to-nature, primitivist group.
In the mid-1970s, MOVE established a headquarters in Powelton
Village, an integrated, new left, section of Philadelphia. There they dis-
rupted community meetings with lengthy harangues based on the teachings
of John Africa. Their primitivism included recycling garbage by throwing
it in their yard; respect for animal life included rats and stray dogs,. They
constantly used profanities and aggressive, confrontational language. These
traits sparked a major lifestyle conflict with the neighborhood.
Police abuse became MOVE'S major political issue. In the politically
charged, post-Viet Nam 1970s, led by the tough "law and order" oriented
Mayor Frank Rizzo, the Philadelphia police were frequently accused of
racism and brutality. MOVE concentrated on protesting police abuse, and
the police in turn focused their attention on MOVE. This led to clashes,
court hearings, protests in courtrooms, contempt citations and more clashes.
A pivotal event was an April 1976 clash between MOVE and police in
which three MOVE leaders were convicted and imprisoned. They referred




The 1978 Powelton conflict consisted of four phases.
Phase I involved ongoing clashes with the police, neighbors, and the
courts.
Phase II involved a heavy police presence at MOVE headquarters. Police
established a twenty-four hour presence to arrest MOVE members if
they left their headquarters.
Phase III was an attempt to evict MOVE from its headquarters by
blockading it, to "starve them out."
Phase IV was an attempt to evict MOVE using armed force—the
Shootout.
The Parties and Issues
Most of the interveners interviewed stated that the parties to the 1978
confrontation were MOVE and the City. In fact, the parties were much
more complex. One set was MOVE and the Powelton neighborhood. The
neighborhood, in turn, m was divided in its response. Some advocated
police intervention while others insisted the problem should be settled in
the community. A third faction sought to reconcile the first two.
MOVE's conflict with the city involved many sub-parties. To MOVE,
Mayor Rizzo represented the law-and-order rule they opposed, and the
police department was continually in confrontation with the activist group.
The department itself was split between the highly professional, trained,
civil disturbances squad and the rank-and-file police who were often called
"Rizzo's thugs." As confrontations with the rank and file evolved, MOVE
came into confrontation with the courts. It used them as a vehicle to dra-
matize its beliefs and issues. MOVE's fundamental issue involved the city
and courts, and more specifically, freedom for its three "political prisoners."
Merger of Issues
In Phase I these issues initially moved on separate tracks. For instance,
there were negotiations between MOVE and its neighbors. However, in
May 1977, MOVE, in responce to another law enforcement incident, dra-
matically appeared on the porch of their barricaded headquarters wearing
military uniforms and carrying weapons. Alarmed, residents called the
police, who responded by laying siege to the house. After a tense initial
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confrontation, the city vowed to maintain a massive police presence and
arrest any MOVE member who left the headquarters. They would mainly
be charged with firearm violations and incitement to riot. These pending
charges became another major issue in the negotiations.
Phase II
Bringing in the police, already a party to the conflict, as a third-party
intervener transformed the conflict and issues. The issue of police presence
outweighed all others. Rather than focus on their conflict with MOVE, the
neighbors argued with each other over whether the police presence was
appropriate. A major faction of the new left neighborhood generally
opposed police intervention. To disengage the police, this group became
involved as third-party intervenor in MOVE'S conflict with the city.
MOVE apparently began to see that by upsetting the neighborhood and
involving the police, it could get public attention for its main issue—
release of its prisoners. Although MOVE seemed to have had little incen-
tive to negotiate with the neighbors at this stage, there is some evidence
they it made at least one agreement.
Composting Agreement
Neighbors approached MOVE about the garbage in their yard. They sug-
gested if MOVE were serious about recycling, then they could do it more
efficiently by composting. That would also meet the neighbors needs by
reducing the odor and vermin food. This example of needs-based bargain-
ing resulted in "wins" for both sides. Although MOVE apparently lived up
to that agreement, the Powelton people interviewed did not remember it.
They were so focused on the life-and-death issues of the massive police
presence, they did not notice an environmental agreement that may have
worked.
Interpol
An example of early mediation intervention was given by Father Paul
Washington, an active black minister. He knew the MOVE leadership and
had helped them visit their incarcerated members. MOVE sympathizers
called him in during Phase II. MOVE was parading on their porch with
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guns, and a tense confrontation with police was in progress. Washington
calmed both sides down and got MOVE to go back into their house to talk.
They were upset because they had heard one of their members, who was
recently arrested, had been beaten by police. Washington shuttled between
MOVE and the police commissioner. He received assurances from the
police that no beating had taken place. He negotiated an agreement that if
the police brought the arrested member to MOVE headquarters to show he
was uninjured, MOVE would relinquish its arms. On his final visit to con-
firm the agreement, Delbert Africa, MOVE'S negotiator, insisted they
would only turn in their guns if their colleagues were released. Washington
concluded that negotiations with MOVE were impossible because they
would keep escalating the stakes.
Delbert Africa, MOVE'S negotiator, in this incident confirmed
Washington's analysis but added a missing piece. He said Washington was
right. MOVE would keep escalating the stakes until someone paid attention
to their basic concern—that is as long as their fundamental issue, freeing
the political prisoners, is being ignored, MOVE would not rest.
Joel Todd
A major intervenor was a young white attorney, Joel Todd. He had rep-
resented Jerry Africa, one of the imprisoned "political prisoners" in his
trial and became friendly with the group. He was well connected with the
city's political structure.
By October of 1977, the Phase II stand-off was four months old. Costs
were mounting for both sides, and MOVE supporters asked Todd to help
them reach a settlement. Todd agreed. His goal was to avoid violence. He
saw the conflict as between MOVE and the city and felt neighborhood was
not a party. He began carrying messages back and forth between the MOVE
headquarters and the city manager's office. He quickly defined each side's
primary issue. MOVE wanted release of its "political prisoners." The city
wanted a face-saving way out of the crisis, preferably by removing MOVE
from the neighborhood.
Todd began to build an agreement with the following terms:
1. MOVE members would submit to orderly arrest procedures concern-
ing the outstanding weapons and riot charges. Procedures would allow wit-
nesses to be present to assure that MOVE members would not be
brutalized, and arrests would be timed so some adult members would
always be in the house to care for the children and animals. Both sides
agreed on these procedures.
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2. Those arrested would be released without posting bail. MOVE wanted
a written guarantee. The city would only give oral assurances.
3. MOVE would permit a weapons search and health inspection of its
premises. Both sides agreed.
4. MOVE would vacate its premises. MOVE disagreed with this.
These provisions were labeled "surrender terms" by the press. They met
the city's basic issue, but the five months of negotiations did not touch
MOVE'S concern about its "political prisoners." While Todd felt MOVE
was so strongly committed to that issue that "they would die for it," he saw
it as an unacceptable demand where no resolution was possible.
This narrow view of what could be negotiated may trace back to Todd's
intervention goal: to avoid violence. A conflict resolution ethical maxim
suggests that when one's sole intervention goal is to avoid violence, one
tends to support the status quo power relationship. That appears to have
taken place here.
Todd defined his intervention style as that of message carrier. He asked
each party what their position was and carried that information to the other
party. He felt it was not appropriate for him to help the parties reality test
their positions or to help them reexamine their needs and those of the other
party in order to invent new solutions. He may have been encouraged in
this approach by MOVE's insistence that "only MOVE negotiates for
MOVE."
MOVE finally broke off negotiations when an imprisoned member was
beaten. The city obtained a court order to evict MOVE by blockading them
and "starving them out." Todd and others obtained a stay, and Todd tried
to arrange a face-to-face negotiation session with MOVE leadership, the
judge, and the city manager. The barricaded MOVE leadership refused to
trust an offer of "safe passage" to the courtroom where the negotiations
were scheduled. Finally, they agreed to let their imprisoned leaders nego-
tiate for the group. That session ended in failure, and the city began the
blockade in earnest. Phase III had begun.
Phase III Interventions
By cordoning off a predominantly black group, cutting off food and
water, and fortifying the police positions, the city made MOVE a cause
celebre, resulting in a flurry of unsuccessful interventions to head off the
clash. Radio personalities were suggested as interveners. Comedian/activist
Dick Gregory met with MOVE once before abandoning his efforts.
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City Wide Coalition
The stage was now set for a more successful intervention. MOVE sup-
porters approached Walt Palmer. Palmer was an established businessman
and civil rights activist with many connections. His goals of intervention
were to avoid violence and to produce a settlement that met the needs of
both parties. He too defined the parties as MOVE and the city. He saw a
major power imbalance. More pressure needed to be applied to get the city
to bargain seriously.
To alter the power relationships, he organized the City Wide Coalition
for Human Rights (CCCHR). CCCHR's religious and business committees
organized those segments of the black community to bring pressure on the
city. The community task force conducted major demonstrations and the
legal task force researched the snarled legal issues. A communications
committee distributed information to the press and defined the situation as
a human rights issue. They even brought the issue before the United
Nations.
Palmer chose Oscar Gaskins, a black civil rights attorney, to negotiate.
Gaskins obtained a power of attorney from MOVE to represent it in nego-
tiations; this gave him credibility as MOVE'S attorney-negotiator.
Impasse Broken
In his negotiations with the city manager's office, Gaskins was the first
intervenor to negotiate MOVE's prisoner issue. City representatives, while
privately agreeing that the charges upon which the prisoners were con-
victed were questionable, felt they could not compromise the legal system
by releasing prisoners under pressure. Gaskins created a solution that met
the interests of both parties. He suggested the prisoners be allowed to
appeal their sentences. The superior court could then release them on their
own recognizance. They were likely to be acquitted on appeal, and if not,
most of their sentence had been served already. Both parties agreed.
Agreement
After breaking this impasse, Gaskins was able to negotiate settlements
on the other issues. The city took the additional step of agreeing to com-
mit themselves in writing to release, without bail, those MOVE members
submitting to arrest. MOVE agreed to allow health and firearm inspections,
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clean the premises, and vacate within 90 days. They also agreed for
Gaskins to represent them in court rather than appear personally, to avoid
confrontations.
Controversy
MOVE complied with much of the agreement. They cleaned the build-
ing and allowed a health inspection, which passed. A firearms inspection
found only inoperative weapons. Controversy arose over the outstanding
charges. MOVE thought they would be dropped. Gaskins felt they would
be routinely processed and MOVE would receive probation. The district
attorney talked about the seriousness of the charges. He started requiring
MOVE members to appear in court which Gaskins and MOVE felt violated
the agreement. The DA changed his mind and felt he was legally bound to
compel MOVE to attend court.
Even more difficult was the requirement for MOVE to relocate within
90 days. Many groups tried to find MOVE rural retreats to practice their
back-to-nature concepts. At one point they were ready to move to a farm
in New Jersey donated by a black farmer.
However, during the 90-day period, MOVE got the impression from a
conversation with the farmer that he wanted to use them for slave labor.
They refused his offer. No one interceded to rectify the problem.
The city took the strict position that MOVE had to be out in 90 days.
MOVE insisted the city should help them find quarters. While private
groups suggested some locations, MOVE found them all lacking. Finally,
the city solicitor was quoted in the newspaper that as soon as the MOVE
premises were vacated the city would bulldoze it. This incensed MOVE
members, who felt they could continue to use their property for other than
residential purposes.
Although Gaskins was available to argue MOVE'S position in court, no
one was available to oversee this growing collection of accusations and
misunderstandings. Finally, at the end of the 90-day period the judge
declared MOVE had broken the agreement. He deputized the police to
forcibly evict MOVE and arrest its members.
After allowing Palmer and a few others to make last minute appeals for
MOVE to surrender, the police moved in. A gunfight broke out in which
one policeman died. Other police and fire-fighters were injured before
MOVE members were finally brought out of the house. One was severely
beaten in front of TV cameras. Newspapers reported that the agreement
failed because MOVE refused to vacate.
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Observations
CCCHR's task was enormous. Many participants sacrificed over six
months of their lives to achieve the agreement. Palmer's activist and street
background gave him credibility and an ability to communicate with
MOVE. He and Gaskins could cajole, confront their positions, and reality
test. They interpreted each party's positions in a way the other could hear.
Their empowerment strategy was effective. The broad community atten-
tion forced the city to bargain more seriously. Its effect may also have gone
the other way, also. The city may have perceived Palmer and Gaskins, with
their community backing, as more able to assure that their clients would
abide by their commitments.
Palmer and Gaskins' indirect "shuttle diplomacy" style made reaching
an agreement easier, since it buffered public officials from MOVE'S out-
bursts. However, when the full agreement is reached through indirect nego-
tiations it may give parties an opportunity to disavow certain provisions.
Jerry Africa, a MOVE'S spokesman, refers to the written agreement as
"Gaskins' agreement" not theirs.
A key element was Gaskins' ability to expand the issue when the par-
ties were deadlocked. He found a solution to the prisoner issue which met
MOVE's goals and maintained the city's concern for the dignity of the law.
He may have been able to interject this solution because he saw his role as
wider than a neutral message bearer. He was an advocate for one party.
Reasons for Failure
The agreement may have failed because one or both sides scuttled it.
Another possibility is that no one was in charge of the implementation
period. Intervenors were too exhausted from the ordeal of reaching agree-
ment to retain vigilance over this key period. In a situation where trust was
so low and verbal dueling so high, postagreement oversight is a crucial issue.
Another problem may have been misperceptions of MOVE's decision-
making structure. Most intervenors, including Palmer and Gaskins, thought
the MOVE spokespeople they worked with either could bind MOVE, or
would have to have the group in the Powelton house ratify the decisions.
Jerry Africa, one of the three "political prisoners," states that MOVE oper-
ated on a consensus process that involved all members—whether present or
not. If he, in prison, disagreed with a commitment made by MOVE nego-
tiators in the house, then the commitment was not binding on any MOVE
member. Whether this interpretation is true is unknown, but it underlines
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the need for intervenors to obtain a clear understanding of the extent to
which negotiators can bind their group.
The failure to involve all parties was also crucial. Since the neighbor-
hood was not included in the negotiation, the city ended up adopting the
most extreme neighborhood position—removing MOVE. That became a
fixed position. The neighborhood's absence prevented the parties from con-
sidering a more moderate approach, such as MOVE remaining while com-
plying with health codes and basic standards of courtesy.
The police were left out. Their ongoing clashes with MOVE set up a
dynamic similar to two warring gangs. After each rumble, one gang wants
to avenge the wrongs from the last clash. Ultimately, police harbored
resentment from the death of one of their members in the shoot-out.
Nothing in the agreement or the aftermath was designed to defuse their
hostility. Untreated police resentment may have contributed to the violence
in 1985.
While MOVE and CCCHR viewed MOVE as a political organization,
the city responded with traditional law enforcement tactics. Unlike a crim-
inal group which might respond to punishment and deterrence, a group that
sees itself as a revolutionary political movement might even be strength-
ened, attract more publicity, and galvanize support from confrontation and
challenge. The presence of the media made it difficult for the city to meet
MOVE'S demands without losing face, even though privately they may
have seen merit in MOVE'S position.
Differing styles of expressing conflict may have been a factor. MOVE'S
rhetoric was laden with violent threats to neighbors, public officials, and
all who opposed them. One never knew to what extent the threats were
real. Some suggest the line between "talking" and "fighting" is different
between street-black and middle class black and white culture. To the mid-
dle class angry words, heat, confrontation, insults and threats will inex-
orably lead to violence. In street black culture, however, there is a clear
separation. "Talking" is verbal: "fighting" is physical. A "fight" begins
when someone within the context of an angry quarrel begins to make a
provocative move. MOVE talked but did not physically provoke con-
frontation.
1978-1982
Ten MOVE members were convicted on conspiracy counts related to the
police officer who was killed in the shoot-out. Charges were dropped against
the officers who beat the captured MOVE leader. Once again, freeing
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prisoners became MOVE'S main articulated issue. MOVE dispersed to
other cities. Mayor Rizzo was succeeded by a moderate who in turn was
succeeded by Philadelphia's first black mayor, Wilson Goode.
Many MOVE members left Philadelphia and established settlements in
New York and Virginia. In the early 1980s the city, processing outstanding
warrants, extradited MOVE members back to Philadelphia. A group settled
on Osage Avenue in a house owned by John Africa's sister. During this
period MOVE spokesperson Jerry Africa pressed MOVE'S position with
anyone in authority he could reach. MOVE insisted it was subject to con-
sistent abuse of the legal process; it was being persecuted and imprisoned
for its belief rather than actions.
Once again, a lifestyle conflict arose in the new Osage Avenue neigh-
borhood. Problems such as sanitation, collecting animals, and cutting flea
collars off neighbors' pets created friction. By October 1983, verbal harass-
ment was added to the list.
The new neighborhood was black, middle class. It was the heart of the
political coalition that had elected Mayor Goode and trusted him to find a
solution to the MOVE problem.
Memories of 1978
All parties involved seemed to operate on assumptions about the others
they had "learned" in 1978. The city, and many potential intervenors,
thought they had learned:
1. MOVE is an untrustworthy bargainer,
2. MOVE will violate any agreement,
3. MOVE is more interested in confrontation than settlement,
4. Therefore, it is unproductive to negotiate with MOVE.
MOVE thought it had learned:
1. The city is an untrustworthy bargainer,
2. The city will violate any agreement,
3. The city is more interested in destroying MOVE than settlement.
4. Therefore, if it is possible to negotiate with the city at all, it is only
when it is subject to broad pressure from an aroused public.
Building Crisis on Osage Avenue
When Jerry Africa's negotiations led nowhere, MOVE began trying to
call attention to their cause using the same techniques that had succeeded
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in 1978. They barricaded their house, mounted loud-speakers in front, and
began harassing the neighborhood.
Neighbors appealed to the city for help, and the city took a wait-and-see
attitude. No broad-based coalition to support a negotiation process arose.
Generally, Philadelphians trusted the new liberal black administration to
find a reasonable solution to the problem.
Most people saw the issue of freeing ten people convicted of killing a
police officer to be an unreasonable demand. Some intervenors unsuccess-
fully involved in the 1978 event advised the mayor that negotiation was
impossible. However, Bennie Swans of the Crisis Intervention Network,
planned a promising approach. His agency had good street contacts with
MOVE. He felt that MOVE was really after an orderly process by which
each of the ten cases could be reviewed. He envisioned persuading MOVE
to change its political tactics. Rather than provoke the neighbors, it might
try to form coalitions with them. An initial bargaining point might be for
MOVE to forgo disturbing people with their loud-speakers if the neighbors
would join them in protesting the imprisonment issue.
Since the Crisis Intervention Network was city funded, Swans sought
clearance from the city manager's office to pursue negotiations. He was
turned away, as were others who tried to intervene. The city had already
decided MOVE was a police matter. Even if the broad decision to negoti-
ate had not already been made, Swans' plan probably would have met with
city resistance. It amounted to building a political coalition directed at
changing city policy. That strategy might have jeopardized the agency's
city funding.
There were a few other attempts to intervene. MOVE participated in all,
but none of the third parties could enlist the city in dialogue.
MOVE continued its harassment, and the neighbors grew more resent-
ful. When they finally appealed for help from the state and threatened
physical retaliation, the city's conflict avoidance policy became unwork-
able. They had to do some thing quick and dramatic. They evacuated the
neighborhood and began the assault. Once again last-minute attempts were
made to defuse the crisis. MOVE received the delegations. The city did not
and went ahead with the armed assault.
A partial explanation of the severity of the police assault may be the
unresolved hostilities between MOVE and the police dating back to the
1978 period. Police were not a party to that agreement, and no follow-up
work was done to defuse those tensions.
An investigative commission issued a report condemning the assault as
being excessively violent and bungled. A local grand jury was formed and
issued no indictments against any public officials. Mayor Goode was
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reelected to serve a second term. Meanwhile, Ramona Africa, sole survivor
of the Osage bombing, was convicted and served time in the state peniten-
tiary on riot related charges.
MOVE still exists in Philadelphia. While John Africa died in the
inferno, some coherency still exists in the group. Its grievances are still the
same—freedom for its "unjustly imprisoned" members. Now the stakes are
higher. The history of clashes that result in violence, followed by punish-
ment of MOVE members and exoneration of city officials is an even greater
barrier to building the trust needed for a settlement.
